Privatizing Police Powers

[SecTrainer]

HAHAHA!! Yeah...Sounds like someone put their foot in their mouth. (Busted)
For someone who claims to know the law...he sure leaves a long paper trail.

A paper trail is one of the awkward consequences of being the sort of person who files lawsuits. Most court records are public information.

[power102]

LOL! It is you... funny how there is a document in your current case where you complain that the defending attorney from the Chillicothe case is the same one defending your former employer in your current case (I can post that too if anyone is interested, it is quite comical).

HAHAHA!! Yeah...Sounds like someone put their foot in their mouth. (Busted)
For someone who claims to know the law...he sure leaves a long paper trail.

[Christopherstjo]

Chris, I commend you on your passion for your DIVE project. But, from what you’ve posted, it sounds like everything revolves around the K.C.M.O. class A license.

I re-wrote my program outline specifically to present to the KCMO police department. This is why I discuss a Class A license in my program outline.

This is very small considering that the license is issued by a single city in this big country.

You are correct. However, in my discussions with a wide range of government officials on both the federal and many state levels throughout the U.S., they all wanted to see my DIVE Team program implemented on a city level first, with documented successes before it could be considered on larger scale, and such is certainly reasonable.

What would be more beneficial to the Security Industry (on a broader scope) is if you formed some sort of non-profit group that worked to expand the training, licensing requirements, and powers of Security Officers on a state by state basis.

FEMA was among the top who were the most interested in my DIVE Team for implementation on a national level under its' umbrella, but as I wrote above, I have to demonstrate its' success on local levels first. To-wit, I have proposed to use KCMO as a pilot program to test the merits and benefits of my program on several levels.

As far as a non-profit org., there are several of us here, in KCMO, that are very interested in doing this and we were looking at a potential ogranization to partner with so we could accomplish this goal. However, I sent my letter of withdraw becasue the organizaiton did not appear to be properly suited.

The decision will not be made for a while. We have to get folks properly trained first and that is a project already in the works, here, that is not of my doing or involvement. Those with decision making authority in the police dept do demonstrate they are interested in the concepts of my program. So for now, its' a waiting game.

[SecTrainer]

Black Caesar

Are you sure Cross v. Chillicothe is one that pertains to me? There is, after all, more than one Christopher Cross in Missouri - careful what you post.

This is a strange denial if, in fact, you were not the same party in that case. One would naturally simply say, "I was not the party in that case".

Yes, Mr. Cross, we do believe you were the party in that case, and for good reason that your own documentation provides.

[SecTrainer]

I received the following private message from SecTrainer and believe it purduent to post my reply here, as well because of the importance of his objection and the importance of my answer.




SecTrainer

Since you claim to have two years of law school, then you should know that case laws are transferrable, in whole or in part, from one case to another.

In other words, while you point out that the case centered on correctional officers, the case is nevertheless applicable to other cases that have the same or similar components, arguements, claims and so forth.

Transferring case laws from one case to another is a legal practice of law that courts, attorney's and many - many others have used for eon's and [U][U]is actually required to be done[/B], by the Courts[/B] during times of filing motions and replies to motions. The only time case laws may not be cited is in the Plaintiffs' Complaint and the Defendant's Answer.

Accordingly:

1. In Jackson County v. State Board of Mediation 690 S.W.2d 400, 402-03 (Mo. banc 1985) the Missouri Supreme Court gave its ruling as to the legislative intent of Section 105.510 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. The Court held:

"The Legislature presumably excluded police and deputy sheriffs from the scope of the statute after concluding that the bargaining rights granted there in would inhibit the discipline and strict impartiality demanded of law enforcement personnel. The Leglisature may well have believed that "membership in [a union] might reasonably cause friction and dissention within the police force and create prejudice and favoritism in the enforcement of the laws." Citing King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68 206 S.W.2d 547, 555 (banc 1947).

The Court went on to state:

"We think the legislative purpose can be best effectuated if the exclusion provision is interpreted to encompass those persons engaged in law enforcement, who, regardless of job title, perform duties and functions substantially comparable to those performed by police and deputy sheriffs." Id at 403.

2. The case of Jackson County v. State Board of Mediation, is cited in the case of Kansas City Firefighters, Local 691 v. City of Kansas City, Public Case No. R 2000-046.

3. The City of Kansas City, sought to block the efforts of private security officers with a Class A license to join a union pursuant to Section 105.510 of the Missouri Revised Statutes on the arguement that private security officers are essentially police officers because of their authority given under Title 17 of the Missouri Code of State Regulations, Sections 10-2.010(3) and 10-2.030(1)(A) (1999).

4. In the case of Jackson County v. State Board of Mediation, the Court knowingly and willingly incorporated [every] security officer with a Class A license, regardless whether or not the security officer is a government or private employee.

5. The Court also knowingly and willingly removed the requirement that a "law enforcement officer" is required to be a "public servant" as section 556.061(17) of the Missouri Revised Statutes, requires.

6. To understand how the federal courts decide whether or not security officers are law enforcement personnel we can plainly see such in the following three case laws; the last one is from the U.S. Supreme Court.

Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian, 184 F.3d 623, 627-30 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that where private security guards are endowed by law with plenary police powers such that they are de facto police officers, they may qualify as state actors under the public function test).

Rodriguez v. Smithfield Packing Co., Inc., 338 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2003) (observing that “the police function is ‘one of the most basic functions of government’” and “an arrest is ‘the function most commonly associated with the police’”) (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978)).

Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109-10 (1945) (holding “one has the power to arrest when one is “clothed with the authority of state law”).

And there are many - many more federal case laws that also demonstrate the validity of my claims; some of, which I cite in my thesis.

7. In the case of Kansas City Firefighters, Local 691 v. City of Kansas City, Public Case No. R 2000-046. The trial court rejected the City's arguement that school district security officers are police because they do not carry firearms and do not have arrest powers to enforce the laws.

8. As a result of this ruling, the State of Missouri clearly and categorically declares that security officers who do carry a firearms and do have arrest powers are members of the police force and police officers, even though they are [privately] employed and have a private security officer's license.

Now, matters of law are almost always complex and a large part of this comes because case laws are transferrable from one case to another. And as a rule of thumb, those in private security and those who are or were police officers, rarely, if every, studdy state and federal case laws so as to know what does and does not apply in their line of duty.

It is not surprising, therefore, that addressing this subject is like speaking a foregin language to others. It is a concept that others simply cannot grasp and many times it is because security officers do not bother to educate themselves in matters of law as it pertains to their jobs.

Hell, I am shocked at the number of security officers I have spoken with here in KCMO, who have never bothered read Title 17. They know they have police powers but only because both security and police officers speak of such in the field rather commonly, especially during times when a suspect has been legally arrested by a security law enforcement officer.

In any event, the case of Jackson County v. State Board of Mediation, not only has a great deal of relevance in my claims but it is also the controlling legal authority existing. And in your claiming to have two years of law school, you should know this to be true.

I hope this helps to answer your question.

Of course the principles of one case certainly can be applied to other cases, nor did I ever suggest otherwise. That is the whole basis of "case law", the principles of precedent, stare decisis, etc.

However, the "transferrability" of findings in one case to another is by no means "automatic". In law school, we had to both compare AND contrast cases, both in terms of distinguishing their facts and the legal principles they represented. It's a very tricky business, believe me, as one who had to stand before the class (just like on "Paper Chase") and explain why an implied contract existed when the Ace Pavement Company accidentally paved the wrong driveway but did not exist when the Acme Fence Company installed a fence on the wrong property. It was, as some wag said, "like eating sawdust without butter". Different decisions sometimes turned on what appeared to be very insignificant factual differences between the cases.

I explained to you, in what I hope you took as a helpful private message that was in no way critical of you, what I believe to be significant distinguishing features of the case you cite with what I (admittedly imperfectly) understand to be the facts in your case.

Here, I think, is the real problem with pro se cases, or self-representation in court, procedural issues aside and with no aspersions intended toward you. Legal analysis isn't merely difficult - it's damned difficult. It isn't merely tricky - it's devilishly tricky. You read an opinion of the Court that seems to strike law that's applicable in your case, only to discover that it does no such thing.

Even Shepardizing cases (which you always want to make sure you do) to determine their subsequent fate in the courts is usually no easy task because you'll often find that your case has been treated very differently when relied upon in subsequent cases. Out of 8 cases citing your reference case, two were upheld, one was not, three made no reference to the case in the opinion, etc., etc. So...now you have to find out why.

As I said, this is not a case that I would have chosen to support my case, but of course, as in everything else, it's just my opinion.

I have attempted to take our conversation off the public forum for reasons I already explained and would regard it as simple courtesy if you would respond to my PRIVATE messages in that same way.

[davis002]

Black Caesar

Are you sure Cross v. Chillicothe is one that pertains to me? There is, after all, more than one Christopher Cross in Missouri - careful what you post.

LOL! It is you... funny how there is a document in your current case where you complain that the defending attorney from the Chillicothe case is the same one defending your former employer in your current case (I can post that too if anyone is interested, it is quite comical).

Besides... I don't see many listings for a Christopher Ray Cross in Kansas City, or all of Missouri for that matter. Kinda crazy, eh?

[Christopherstjo]

Part of the problem is how screwed up Missouri law is. While I agree with many here that some of what Mr. Cross believes is at best a stretch, we also have to take into consideration where he is.

And just think, there are 29 other states just as screwed up... Now isn't that just the kicker

He's not the only one of the opinion that KCMO S?Os are Quasi Police. KAPI link

Hmmm, could that be becuse there is validity in the claims asserted

While what Cross is saying doesn't make a lot of sense to us

Well, that's the understatement of the centry.

. . . we should keep in mind one thing we all know. Many places have laws about private security that are just down right stupid.

Be that as it may be - it is the law nonetheless.

[Christopherstjo]

Black Caesar

Are you sure Cross v. Chillicothe is one that pertains to me? There is, after all, more than one Christopher Cross in Missouri - careful what you post.

[Christopherstjo]

I received the following private message from SecTrainer and believe it purduent to post my reply here, as well because of the importance of his objection and the importance of my answer.

Admittedly, my legal training is limited to two years of law school (no, before you ask, I didn't flunk out - I simply lost interest the further along I went), so I will not hold myself out as an attorney. However, in that time I did learn to read cases and it has served me very well.

Jackson County v. Missouri State Board of Mediation does not appear to support your position in any way, and I suggest that you read it again.

First, the scope of the case is the law pertaining to the right of the "Employees....of any public body" and its applicability of a certain class of such employees - i.e., correctional officers - to form or join a union. The scope itself puts the case somewhat off-point with respect to your claim right out of the gate.

Second, in the paragraph that comments on the common definition of "police", you seem to be ignoring the critical phrase "...any organized civil force..." - not "any force", and certainly not any private force.

Third, the court found that correctional officers, even though they have a historical association with sheriff's deputies, are not considered police, and among the reasons discussed were that they are not charged with enforcing state law on a countywide basis (as Class A officers are not, either), and are not required to complete a 600-hour police academy (as Class A officers are not, either).

In other words, the very reasons that correctional officers - even though "they may indeed perform limited police functions" - are not considered to be police would appear to apply to the Class A officer as well, down the line. For these and other reasons, the Supreme Court joined the Appellate Court in overturning the circuit court which had held that correctional officers should be considered to be "police" and that they therefore should not be prohibited from joining a union.

In all honesty, Mr. Cross, I cannot see how in the world this case supports your position. Quite the opposite, in fact.

SecTrainer

Since you claim to have two years of law school, then you should know that case laws are transferrable, in whole or in part, from one case to another.

In other words, while you point out that the case centered on correctional officers, the case is nevertheless applicable to other cases that have the same or similar components, arguements, claims and so forth.

Transferring case laws from one case to another is a legal practice of law that courts, attorney's and many - many others have used for eon's and [U][U]is actually required to be done[/B], by the Courts[/B] during times of filing motions and replies to motions. The only time case laws may not be cited is in the Plaintiffs' Complaint and the Defendant's Answer.

Accordingly:

1. In Jackson County v. State Board of Mediation 690 S.W.2d 400, 402-03 (Mo. banc 1985) the Missouri Supreme Court gave its ruling as to the legislative intent of Section 105.510 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. The Court held:

"The Legislature presumably excluded police and deputy sheriffs from the scope of the statute after concluding that the bargaining rights granted there in would inhibit the discipline and strict impartiality demanded of law enforcement personnel. The Leglisature may well have believed that "membership in [a union] might reasonably cause friction and dissention within the police force and create prejudice and favoritism in the enforcement of the laws." Citing King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68 206 S.W.2d 547, 555 (banc 1947).

The Court went on to state:

"We think the legislative purpose can be best effectuated if the exclusion provision is interpreted to encompass those persons engaged in law enforcement, who, regardless of job title, perform duties and functions substantially comparable to those performed by police and deputy sheriffs." Id at 403.

2. The case of Jackson County v. State Board of Mediation, is cited in the case of Kansas City Firefighters, Local 691 v. City of Kansas City, Public Case No. R 2000-046.

3. The City of Kansas City, sought to block the efforts of private security officers with a Class A license to join a union pursuant to Section 105.510 of the Missouri Revised Statutes on the arguement that private security officers are essentially police officers because of their authority given under Title 17 of the Missouri Code of State Regulations, Sections 10-2.010(3) and 10-2.030(1)(A) (1999).

4. In the case of Jackson County v. State Board of Mediation, the Court knowingly and willingly incorporated [every] security officer with a Class A license, regardless whether or not the security officer is a government or private employee.

5. The Court also knowingly and willingly removed the requirement that a "law enforcement officer" is required to be a "public servant" as section 556.061(17) of the Missouri Revised Statutes, requires.

6. To understand how the federal courts decide whether or not security officers are law enforcement personnel we can plainly see such in the following three case laws; the last one is from the U.S. Supreme Court.

Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian, 184 F.3d 623, 627-30 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that where private security guards are endowed by law with plenary police powers such that they are de facto police officers, they may qualify as state actors under the public function test).

Rodriguez v. Smithfield Packing Co., Inc., 338 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2003) (observing that “the police function is ‘one of the most basic functions of government’” and “an arrest is ‘the function most commonly associated with the police’”) (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978)).

Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109-10 (1945) (holding “one has the power to arrest when one is “clothed with the authority of state law”).

And there are many - many more federal case laws that also demonstrate the validity of my claims; some of, which I cite in my thesis.

7. In the case of Kansas City Firefighters, Local 691 v. City of Kansas City, Public Case No. R 2000-046. The trial court rejected the City's arguement that school district security officers are police because they do not carry firearms and do not have arrest powers to enforce the laws.

8. As a result of this ruling, the State of Missouri clearly and categorically declares that security officers who do carry a firearms and do have arrest powers are members of the police force and police officers, even though they are [privately] employed and have a private security officer's license.

Now, matters of law are almost always complex and a large part of this comes because case laws are transferrable from one case to another. And as a rule of thumb, those in private security and those who are or were police officers, rarely, if every, studdy state and federal case laws so as to know what does and does not apply in their line of duty.

It is not surprising, therefore, that addressing this subject is like speaking a foregin language to others. It is a concept that others simply cannot grasp and many times it is because security officers do not bother to educate themselves in matters of law as it pertains to their jobs.

Hell, I am shocked at the number of security officers I have spoken with here in KCMO, who have never bothered read Title 17. They know they have police powers but only because both security and police officers speak of such in the field rather commonly, especially during times when a suspect has been legally arrested by a security law enforcement officer.

In any event, the case of Jackson County v. State Board of Mediation, not only has a great deal of relevance in my claims but it is also the controlling legal authority existing. And in your claiming to have two years of law school, you should know this to be true.

I hope this helps to answer your question.

Chris, once more. Are you a commissioned, fully empowered law enforcement officer by title (police, deputy sheriff, trooper, whatever), or a security guard/officer?

Don't quote obscure, meaningless arguments, answer the question.

I, on the other hand, am quite clear on my end. I am a security guard. I've been a real police officer, and a real deputy sheriff. Now, I am a real guard. I don't need or want "arrest or law enforcement" authority.

I am a commissioned security law enforcement officer pursuant to...(the courts ruling specifically removes the requirement that a law enforcement officer is required to be or is only a "public servant" and the court specifically incorporated security officers with a Class A license into the definition of a law enforcement officer.

I guess that means no.

Ignored.

[davis002]

Davis...I think you just rid SIW of insects. (with those links...he just made a fool of himself.) IMO...He doesn't have a leg to stand on in the

I googled "christopherstjo" just for ****'s & giggles and I came across some funny stuff. I won't get into what I read...for the sake of preventing the guy from being totally humiliated. but...WOW! yeah...some funny (and creepy) stuff.

I don't think he is gone... we aren't that lucky. This is an ego thing to him or something. I did a quick google of his screen name too. He is posting his arrogance EVERYWHERE! What I find humorous is the fact that he is getting the same response everywhere he goes. He is well-educated and well-spoken, but as soon as anyone disagrees with him he pounds his chest and foams at the mouth. As I said before, he has some good ideas and I agree with some of the points he has made. He just needs to stop acting like a rabid animal whenever someone disagrees with his point of view. He is also very "sue happy" and reading some of his court complaints is nothing short of... well... entertaining.

[power102]

Davis...I think you just rid SIW of insects. (with those links...he just made a fool of himself.) IMO...He doesn't have a leg to stand on in the "Cross v. North Kansas City Security Patrol Service Inc."
One of the guys I used to work with in Houston tried to pursue the same kind of case....and the judge threw it out.


I googled "christopherstjo" just for laughs and I came across some funny stuff. I won't get into what I read...for the sake of preventing the guy from being totally humiliated. but...WOW! yeah...some funny (and creepy) stuff.

[Black Caesar]

For those who are interested...

Cross v. North Kansas City Security Patrol Service Inc.

Case Summary

Complaint

Just for fun...

Cross vs. City of Chillicothe

Complaint

Jeez.......

Talk about Axes being ground lol.

[SecTrainer]

For those who are interested...

Cross v. North Kansas City Security Patrol Service Inc.

Case Summary

Complaint

Just for fun...

Cross vs. City of Chillicothe

Complaint

Yes, I've been following along whenever my migraine clears.

[davis002]

Cross v. North Kansas City Security Patrol Service Inc.

For those who are interested...

Cross v. North Kansas City Security Patrol Service Inc.

Case Summary

Complaint

Just for fun...

Cross vs. City of Chillicothe

Complaint