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    SecTrainer
    Senior Member

  • SecTrainer
    replied
    Originally posted by Bill Warnock
    SecTrainer in 1975 a destroyer was sailing up the channel to its berth. Passing along were locked magazines whose doors were opened by the radar's signal strength. The large sign before entering the channel told the craft's operator entering to turn off active radar.
    This caught all government agencies, the private sector and device manufacturers off balance. After they figured it all out, device makers made required changes to their hardware for the user community at large for specific clients modifications were sent with the gear. Retrofiting for already installed gear really jumped into high gear. The military and other governmental laboratories put forth maximum effort to solve this and like interference problems.
    You see problems like this when visiting places where security screening is employed.
    PM will name the exact location.
    Bill
    Got it, thanks.

    Makes you wonder if these days they couldn't use some sort of low-power coded/encrypted digital radio beacon, and retrofit the ship with a simple switch-receiver that would decode and authenticate the signal, and then automatically switch off the radar, perhaps with some sort of warning and override capability?
    SecTrainer
    Senior Member
    Last edited by SecTrainer; 04-28-2007, 07:51 PM.

    Leave a comment:

  • Bill Warnock
    Senior Member

  • Bill Warnock
    replied
    Originally posted by SecTrainer
    Bill - thanks VERY much for those analogies/examples.

    I'm not familiar with your reference to the ship radar incident(s), however. Would you mind elaborating?

    Thanks!
    SecTrainer in 1975 a destroyer was sailing up the channel to its berth. Passing along were locked magazines whose doors were opened by the radar's signal strength. The large sign before entering the channel told the craft's operator entering to turn off active radar.
    This caught all government agencies, the private sector and device manufacturers off balance. After they figured it all out, device makers made required changes to their hardware for the user community at large for specific clients modifications were sent with the gear. Retrofiting for already installed gear really jumped into high gear. The military and other governmental laboratories put forth maximum effort to solve this and like interference problems.
    You see problems like this when visiting places where security screening is employed.
    PM will name the exact location.
    Bill

    Leave a comment:

  • SecTrainer
    Senior Member

  • SecTrainer
    replied
    Originally posted by Bill Warnock
    SecTrainer a few things come to mind:

    The proper use of "fail safe" and "fail security" designs. Nothing like getting into a secure space when the fire alarm is activated.

    Site selection may require ferrite beads or RFI gaskets to disapate static electricity and radio frequency problems.
    Remember the Navy's experience when special stores bunkers opened when a ship running active radar ran up the channel?

    Opening mechanics of grounding to activate as opposed to positive current release.

    Unshielded low voltage conductors too close to AC conductors upon which an AC voltage is injected.
    Nothing like the protected spaces looking down the throat of a microwave tower bounced around by side-lobe propagation.
    Hope this is helpful,
    Bill
    Bill - thanks VERY much for those analogies/examples.

    I'm not familiar with your reference to the ship radar incident(s), however. Would you mind elaborating?

    Thanks!

    Leave a comment:

  • Bill Warnock
    Senior Member

  • Bill Warnock
    replied
    SecTrainer a few things come to mind:

    The proper use of "fail safe" and "fail security" designs. Nothing like getting into a secure space when the fire alarm is activated.

    Site selection may require ferrite beads or RFI gaskets to disapate static electricity and radio frequency problems.
    Remember the Navy's experience when special stores bunkers opened when a ship running active radar ran up the channel?

    Opening mechanics of grounding to activate as opposed to positive current release.

    Unshielded low voltage conductors too close to AC conductors upon which an AC voltage is injected.
    Nothing like the protected spaces looking down the throat of a microwave tower bounced around by side-lobe propagation.
    Hope this is helpful,
    Bill

    Leave a comment:

  • SecTrainer
    Senior Member

  • SecTrainer
    started a topic Access Control Paradigms

    Access Control Paradigms

    I'm currently writing a module on Access Control Management and thinking about the differences between two AC paradigms, which would also be applicable to physical security design. I'll list the two paradigms and am asking for your thoughts about the advantages/disadvantages of either one over the other

    1. "Open-to-Closed": We start by considering the facility as being "wide open" - with FULL access to EVERYONE - and then we implement or "add" restrictions one by one to "lock down" the facility to eliminate all identified forms of unacceptable/disallowed access, based on the business purposes/uses of the facility.

    2. "Closed-to-Open": Here, we start by considering the facility as being completely "locked down" - providing NO access to ANYONE - and then we remove restrictions one by one based on demonstrated need for access, until the access pattern permits all legitimate forms of access and activity as demanded by the business/usage purposes of the facility.

    Some questions might be:

    1. Do you think both paradigms would ultimately arrive at the same access control pattern, just from different directions, or do you think that the process of adding restrictions to a "FULL-OPEN" facility might result in a different access pattern than the process of removing restrictions from a "FULL-CLOSED" facility?

    2. Do you think there would be a difference in the access control systems we might use or consider using if we used one paradigm rather than the other?

    3. Do you think that one paradigm offers any advantage over the other in terms of avoiding "unintentional consequences" or "holes" in the access control system?

    Any thoughts at all are appreciated!
    SecTrainer
    Senior Member
    Last edited by SecTrainer; 04-28-2007, 01:50 PM.

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