I just ran across an incident that will strike a chord of recognition with many members, I'm sure.
An individual went into an office building near the New York Stock Exchange, having a legitimate appointment with someone in the building. The security officer correctly detained him while the occupant was called to verify the appointment. However, the occupant did not answer the phone.
The individual said, "Wait a minute...I know someone else in the building and was going to see them later. I'll call them on my cell phone to see if they can see me now." He made the call and handed the phone to the security officer, who heard a voice saying "Oh, yes, that's fine. I'm on the 7th floor. Send him on up."
It happened that both the initial and the second visits were perfectly legitimate. However, the security officer had no way of knowing who was really on the other end of the cell phone call or even that the person he was talking to was even in the building...it could have been Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, for all he knew.
It's too easy to take an "acquiescent" attitude toward our jobs. We do not want to be unreasonable, and it's always the path of least resistance to comply with someone's request, especially if they've handed us a "reasonable basis" for our decision to comply.
Clients do not want security to be "obstructive" to their business operations, either. It's a real paradox that clients will pay for security and then apply pressure to keep security from providing security if it "gets in the way" even the slightest bit! This is something that security management must deal with by confronting executives with the simple fact that security and an attitude of unthinking acquiescence simply do not go together.
One thing that security management must do, however, in a time when the bad guys are forever thinking up new ways to defeat security, is to empower and encourage officers to think outside the box. The old attitude that every situation the officer will encounter is covered in the post orders is a dog that just doesn't hunt anymore (if it ever did).
If management does want everything to be covered in post orders, it can be done very simply. Simply create a "fail-safe" order that empowers the officer to override all other normal access procedures by REFUSING ENTRY when he has reason to think that he is dealing with an unusual situation or a previously unknown method of unauthorized entry is being attempted. If he isn't confident in the individual's credentials, etc., for any reason, he is empowered to refuse entry as the "fail-safe" decision.
There should then also be an emergency means of accessing a supervisor IMMEDIATELY, at least by telephone, 24 x 7 and the company should see to it that a supervisor IS TRULY AVAILABLE to any officer 24 x 7. The supervisor would then assess the situation and take responsibility for the final disposition as to whether access is granted or not.
Also (and this is very important), officers who DO recognize such potential situations and react properly to them by denying access when they become suspicious of someone seeking access (even if the actual situation turns out not to be a genuine attack) SHOULD BE REWARDED for being cautious, instead of being second-guessed with the 20/20 vision of hindsight, scolded or ridiculed as "nervous Nellies" or even disciplined, as sometimes happens when officers show the slightest bit of initiative and intelligence.
An individual went into an office building near the New York Stock Exchange, having a legitimate appointment with someone in the building. The security officer correctly detained him while the occupant was called to verify the appointment. However, the occupant did not answer the phone.
The individual said, "Wait a minute...I know someone else in the building and was going to see them later. I'll call them on my cell phone to see if they can see me now." He made the call and handed the phone to the security officer, who heard a voice saying "Oh, yes, that's fine. I'm on the 7th floor. Send him on up."
It happened that both the initial and the second visits were perfectly legitimate. However, the security officer had no way of knowing who was really on the other end of the cell phone call or even that the person he was talking to was even in the building...it could have been Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, for all he knew.
It's too easy to take an "acquiescent" attitude toward our jobs. We do not want to be unreasonable, and it's always the path of least resistance to comply with someone's request, especially if they've handed us a "reasonable basis" for our decision to comply.
Clients do not want security to be "obstructive" to their business operations, either. It's a real paradox that clients will pay for security and then apply pressure to keep security from providing security if it "gets in the way" even the slightest bit! This is something that security management must deal with by confronting executives with the simple fact that security and an attitude of unthinking acquiescence simply do not go together.
One thing that security management must do, however, in a time when the bad guys are forever thinking up new ways to defeat security, is to empower and encourage officers to think outside the box. The old attitude that every situation the officer will encounter is covered in the post orders is a dog that just doesn't hunt anymore (if it ever did).
If management does want everything to be covered in post orders, it can be done very simply. Simply create a "fail-safe" order that empowers the officer to override all other normal access procedures by REFUSING ENTRY when he has reason to think that he is dealing with an unusual situation or a previously unknown method of unauthorized entry is being attempted. If he isn't confident in the individual's credentials, etc., for any reason, he is empowered to refuse entry as the "fail-safe" decision.
There should then also be an emergency means of accessing a supervisor IMMEDIATELY, at least by telephone, 24 x 7 and the company should see to it that a supervisor IS TRULY AVAILABLE to any officer 24 x 7. The supervisor would then assess the situation and take responsibility for the final disposition as to whether access is granted or not.
Also (and this is very important), officers who DO recognize such potential situations and react properly to them by denying access when they become suspicious of someone seeking access (even if the actual situation turns out not to be a genuine attack) SHOULD BE REWARDED for being cautious, instead of being second-guessed with the 20/20 vision of hindsight, scolded or ridiculed as "nervous Nellies" or even disciplined, as sometimes happens when officers show the slightest bit of initiative and intelligence.
Comment