In Florida, security officers have no more (or less) authority as a private citizen, as they are, in fact private persons subject to the jurisidiction of the State of Florida. As such, they are afforded basic rights under the State Constitution, including the right to defend themselves from attack.
Florida Statute 776.013 provides that use of force is justifable against another when certain circumstances are met, in the defense of others. The statute is listed below, from Florida Statutes 2005 Edition.
"776.031 Use of force in defense of others.--A person is justified in the use of force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on, or other tortious or criminal interference with, either real property other than a dwelling or personal property, lawfully in his or her possession or in the possession of another who is a member of his or her immediate family or household or of a person whose property he or she has a legal duty to protect. However, the person is justified in the use of deadly force only if he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person does not have a duty to retreat if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be."
As stated above, a security officer is a person subject to the state's jurisdiction. Therefore, one can safely assume that they are accorded the justifcation to use force to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on, or other tortious or criminal interference with real property in the posession of a person who's property he or she has a legal duty to protect.
The person does not have a duty to retreat if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be. The security officer's contractual obligation to the client would create the "right to be."
Licensed Contract Security Officers are governed by additional statute, Chapter 493 of Florida State Statutes. Any armed security officer is required to be licensed under the chapter, as well as any security officer working for a contract security company, which additionally must also be licensed.
Chapter 493.6118 provides for grounds for disciplinary action, which the chapter authorizes the Department of Agroculture and Consumer Services to levy fines, revoke professional licensing, or file a misdemeanor charge against the individual under FSS 493.6120(1).
FSS 493.6118(j) reads as follows, as a grounds for disiplinary action: "Commission of an act of violence or the use of force on any person except in the lawful protection of one's self or another from physical harm."
As stated, it appears that FSS 493.6118(j) makes it a misdemeanor violation, as well as grounds for revocation of professional license, to use force or an "act of violence" to terminate or prevent trespass or interference with property.
Florida is a state that issues a duty for all residents of the state to quell a breach of the peace, and enables them to detain for such breaches of the peace so that the violator may be brought before a magistrate. Florida also uses the "felony detainment doctrine," in which a private person may make a detainment of another who commits a felony in their presence for the purposes of remanding them to the custody of a competent law enforcement officer in the jurisdiction.
Both of these instances have been used by law enforcement officers in the performance of their duties, outside their juristictions, rendering them private persons, in the apprehension of DUI suspects who were creating a breach of the peace by their dangerous and reckless operation of a motor vehicle - endangering the public. While the crime DUI is not a felony, it is a breach of the peace, allowing the officers acting as private persons to effect the detainment.
However, FSS 493.6118(i) specifically lists an "impersonation of government employee or law enforcement officer" clause, which imposes a greater restriction on the contract security officer than 843.08, which governs impersonating a law enforcement officer. 493.6118(i) is listed below.
"Impersonating, or permitting or aiding and abetting an employee to impersonate, a law enforcement officer or an employee of the state, the United States, or any political subdivision thereof by identifying himself or herself as a federal, state, county, or municipal law enforcement officer or official representative, by wearing a uniform or presenting or displaying a badge or credentials that would cause a reasonable person to believe that he or she is a law enforcement officer or that he or she has official authority, by displaying any flashing or warning vehicular lights other than amber colored, or by committing any act that is intended to falsely convey official status."
In this clause, it can be argued that a contract security officer wearing a similar uniform to a police officer, which is common, as both professions wear military-style uniforms with sam-browne belts festoon with equipment, or garrison belts without equipment, and hard or soft badges, and conveying that he has the official authority to detain an individual would be in violation of 493.6118(i), and therefore guilty of a misdemeanor.
This becomes worse when the officer is armed, as it is now a compounding felony.
The question becomes even more muddled when you ask, "If an agency trains their employees to detain or use force to protect their property, so much as holding out a hand or standing in front of someone to bar their entry, will they face revocation of their agency license for conspiracy to violate 493.6118(j)? Will the Class DI security officer school instructors who teach that detainment for breach of the peace, felony in presence, or force to protect property lose their licenses, as well, for teaching tactics which violate 493.6118(j)?"
Also, the wearing of "police-style" uniforms comes into question. If the element of the crime of impersonation, under 843.08 requires "intent to decieve," yet 493.6118(i) requires only a uniform or badge which causes the reasonable person to believe that the wearer has official authority. Being confused with, for example, a Division of Capital Police employee (state employee with official authority) is grounds for discipline, or confusment with a park ranger (who has official authority.) Attempting to effect a detainment may also lead to a claim of "official authority," which the security officer does not have.
This is a perplexing quandry, and one that the security industry in other states are well to ensure that stop-gap regulation does not occur at home.
Florida Statute 776.013 provides that use of force is justifable against another when certain circumstances are met, in the defense of others. The statute is listed below, from Florida Statutes 2005 Edition.
"776.031 Use of force in defense of others.--A person is justified in the use of force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on, or other tortious or criminal interference with, either real property other than a dwelling or personal property, lawfully in his or her possession or in the possession of another who is a member of his or her immediate family or household or of a person whose property he or she has a legal duty to protect. However, the person is justified in the use of deadly force only if he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person does not have a duty to retreat if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be."
As stated above, a security officer is a person subject to the state's jurisdiction. Therefore, one can safely assume that they are accorded the justifcation to use force to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on, or other tortious or criminal interference with real property in the posession of a person who's property he or she has a legal duty to protect.
The person does not have a duty to retreat if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be. The security officer's contractual obligation to the client would create the "right to be."
Licensed Contract Security Officers are governed by additional statute, Chapter 493 of Florida State Statutes. Any armed security officer is required to be licensed under the chapter, as well as any security officer working for a contract security company, which additionally must also be licensed.
Chapter 493.6118 provides for grounds for disciplinary action, which the chapter authorizes the Department of Agroculture and Consumer Services to levy fines, revoke professional licensing, or file a misdemeanor charge against the individual under FSS 493.6120(1).
FSS 493.6118(j) reads as follows, as a grounds for disiplinary action: "Commission of an act of violence or the use of force on any person except in the lawful protection of one's self or another from physical harm."
As stated, it appears that FSS 493.6118(j) makes it a misdemeanor violation, as well as grounds for revocation of professional license, to use force or an "act of violence" to terminate or prevent trespass or interference with property.
Florida is a state that issues a duty for all residents of the state to quell a breach of the peace, and enables them to detain for such breaches of the peace so that the violator may be brought before a magistrate. Florida also uses the "felony detainment doctrine," in which a private person may make a detainment of another who commits a felony in their presence for the purposes of remanding them to the custody of a competent law enforcement officer in the jurisdiction.
Both of these instances have been used by law enforcement officers in the performance of their duties, outside their juristictions, rendering them private persons, in the apprehension of DUI suspects who were creating a breach of the peace by their dangerous and reckless operation of a motor vehicle - endangering the public. While the crime DUI is not a felony, it is a breach of the peace, allowing the officers acting as private persons to effect the detainment.
However, FSS 493.6118(i) specifically lists an "impersonation of government employee or law enforcement officer" clause, which imposes a greater restriction on the contract security officer than 843.08, which governs impersonating a law enforcement officer. 493.6118(i) is listed below.
"Impersonating, or permitting or aiding and abetting an employee to impersonate, a law enforcement officer or an employee of the state, the United States, or any political subdivision thereof by identifying himself or herself as a federal, state, county, or municipal law enforcement officer or official representative, by wearing a uniform or presenting or displaying a badge or credentials that would cause a reasonable person to believe that he or she is a law enforcement officer or that he or she has official authority, by displaying any flashing or warning vehicular lights other than amber colored, or by committing any act that is intended to falsely convey official status."
In this clause, it can be argued that a contract security officer wearing a similar uniform to a police officer, which is common, as both professions wear military-style uniforms with sam-browne belts festoon with equipment, or garrison belts without equipment, and hard or soft badges, and conveying that he has the official authority to detain an individual would be in violation of 493.6118(i), and therefore guilty of a misdemeanor.
This becomes worse when the officer is armed, as it is now a compounding felony.
The question becomes even more muddled when you ask, "If an agency trains their employees to detain or use force to protect their property, so much as holding out a hand or standing in front of someone to bar their entry, will they face revocation of their agency license for conspiracy to violate 493.6118(j)? Will the Class DI security officer school instructors who teach that detainment for breach of the peace, felony in presence, or force to protect property lose their licenses, as well, for teaching tactics which violate 493.6118(j)?"
Also, the wearing of "police-style" uniforms comes into question. If the element of the crime of impersonation, under 843.08 requires "intent to decieve," yet 493.6118(i) requires only a uniform or badge which causes the reasonable person to believe that the wearer has official authority. Being confused with, for example, a Division of Capital Police employee (state employee with official authority) is grounds for discipline, or confusment with a park ranger (who has official authority.) Attempting to effect a detainment may also lead to a claim of "official authority," which the security officer does not have.
This is a perplexing quandry, and one that the security industry in other states are well to ensure that stop-gap regulation does not occur at home.
Comment