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  1. #1
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    Angry Who's Liable? Company or Terrorists?

    A bit shocking, IMHO:

    http://www.securityinfowatch.com/art...on=329&id=6163

    Jury found that ""agency was 68 percent liable for the bombing and that terrorists were 32 percent liable" -- what do you think?

    Notable was that there was a security review prior to the attacks that said the garage was a potential target. But my question is should a company or Port Authority or whomever be more liable for a terrorist action than the terrorists themselves?


    Geoff Kohl, editor
    SecurityInfoWatch.com

  2. #2
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    The ultimate application of "failure to do due diligence," I guess. This rings of most suit over security inadequacy. You have a report conducted, it shows deficiency, and then it comes out in court - and boom. Its your fault.
    Some Kind of Commando Leader

    "Every time I see another crazy Florida post, I'm glad I don't work there." ~ Minneapolis Security on Florida Security Law

  3. #3
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    The authority was forewarned by folks like me, security consultants, that unless they did certain things there was a great likelyhood of a terrorist event. Forseeability is one of the hallmarks of this business. The reasonable prudent man theory takes hold in this instance.
    N.A. Corbier and I are of one mind.
    Enjoy the day,
    Bill

  4. #4
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    Default Negligence vs malicious intent

    This vedict confuses negligence and malicious intent. Both principles are different and by law are viewed in different lights. This case should be overturned based on that fact. When all the evidence is viewed the Port Authority does carry most of the blame for negligence and should be held accountable.

    Chris
    Security Project Manager

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    Quote Originally Posted by EERecovery
    This vedict confuses negligence and malicious intent. Both principles are different and by law are viewed in different lights. This case should be overturned based on that fact. When all the evidence is viewed the Port Authority does carry most of the blame for negligence and should be held accountable.

    Chris
    Security Project Manager
    You have a point, in the lack of malicious intent, but what about the standard of care that the port authority had to the public using those facilities? Would willful negligence, orchestrated by a government/corporate bureaucry be called malicious?
    Some Kind of Commando Leader

    "Every time I see another crazy Florida post, I'm glad I don't work there." ~ Minneapolis Security on Florida Security Law

  6. #6
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    The Authority was informed by two separate security surveys the garage was an accident waiting to happen. Further they also were warned to move emergency lighting circuitry from the main buss room. Simply stated, standard building lighting on one side of the building and emergency lighting to a different location. They chose to ignore these recommendations. To add insult to injury, since they are a government entity they could waive both national, state and local Electrical and Life Safety Codes. That smacks of gross negligence.
    Enjoy the day,
    Bill

  7. #7

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    Bill touched upon one key phrase here?reasonable. Key phrases that I haven?t seen brought forward yet are, foreseeable incident and probability of incident.

    It may be foreseeable that space aliens will kill cows, but not probable. It is probable and foreseeable that a terrorist organization may hijack a truck full of Hazmat and drive it into a large municipal water reservoir, but absolute protection against this is not reasonable.

    The WTC bombing was beyond foreseeable and probable, it was KNOWN that plans existed among terrorist groups that it was a target. The people responsible to securing the garage became liable because they chose not to implement reasonable defensive measures. I would be hard pressed to find WTC liability in the 9/11 aircraft attacks, but the garage could have been protected without excessive cost and inconvenience to the building.

  8. #8
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    Quote Originally Posted by AASC Colorado
    Bill touched upon one key phrase here?reasonable. Key phrases that I haven?t seen brought forward yet are, foreseeable incident and probability of incident.

    It may be foreseeable that space aliens will kill cows, but not probable. It is probable and foreseeable that a terrorist organization may hijack a truck full of Hazmat and drive it into a large municipal water reservoir, but absolute protection against this is not reasonable.

    The WTC bombing was beyond foreseeable and probable, it was KNOWN that plans existed among terrorist groups that it was a target. The people responsible to securing the garage became liable because they chose not to implement reasonable defensive measures. I would be hard pressed to find WTC liability in the 9/11 aircraft attacks, but the garage could have been protected without excessive cost and inconvenience to the building.
    Now that would not be a trial I'd like to see. Liability for 9/11 would be hard pressed, at best, unless you could plan to shoot an aircraft out of downtown NY airspace without it crashing and destroying SOMETHING on the way down.
    Some Kind of Commando Leader

    "Every time I see another crazy Florida post, I'm glad I don't work there." ~ Minneapolis Security on Florida Security Law

  9. #9
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    I think with Terrorism Law Enforcement Agencies, Military and security cant aford to 2nd guess anymore. After watching inside 9/11 it showed that our government first learned in what 94 or 96 97 that al quida is going to hijack american airliners and attack american targets. This is whwen we needed to do something. I also seen that we had a few chances to send a unit of men in to get bin laden but the president admin turned the plan down. I seen that the Pres admin was first told about al quida from the FBI and CIA in 1992 or 93. The USS Cole Attack was a act of war, however we never launched anything. So no longer can we ignore intell info or other terrorism indicators. We cant 2nd guess anymore. When you 2nd guess a important thing like terrorism (homeland security) people may die as on 9/11 was it over 3,000 were killed in one day. If we learn anything from this we need to learn to stay up on our game and no more 2nd guessing.

    Stay Safe All

  10. #10
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    N.A. and S/O245 have made very valid observations. This is what I send to anyone who requests my assistance. N.A. and Geoff, you have the entire package so you know where I am coming from.

    F. THREAT ANALYSIS:

    The free world and this country in particular are at war ? a war involving the three C?s: Crusader, Crazy, and Criminal. The Crusader is by far the most dangerous of the three. His or her mission is a divine calling, ?God wills it.? They are not insane. Their mission is to be a hero for their cause, which for the most part is fanatic religious zeal, and if that means giving up their lives in the pursuit of that cause, then they have achieved a noble end. Their suicide will inspire others to do the same in the name of the sacred cause. The Crazy sees the aftermath of the Crusader hear voices and act. The Criminal exploits the actions of the other two for profit or advantage.

    In security and law enforcement, when we fail there are agonizing visits to hospitals, funeral homes and cemeteries. As in a military campaign, we are guided by the principle of ?calculated risk.? Correctly interpreted it means: ?When we expose our position or disposition to the enemy, we must inflict more damage to the enemy as a result of such exposure than the enemy can inflict on us.? The only difference between a rut and a grave is the depth. To eliminate the rapaciousness of crime and terrorism: ?root, stem and branch,?* management must, as a priority role, instill in both workers and visitors the need to work in a team like atmosphere. No single division office or branch can or should have to do it alone all must participate. (*Source: New York Police Commissioner Howard Safir, Exclusive Interview, The NarcOfficer®, September/October 1997.)

    The threat tricostate: Criticality, Sensitivity and Vulnerability. Threats are either postulated or credible. The postulated threat is that which could possibly happen to the person, place, or thing to be protected. The credible threat is that which is most likely to happen, in varying degrees of probability, to the person, place, or thing to be protected. This survey should place a particular focus on credible threats. Concurrently, this survey should delve into postulated threats that are factors normally predictable through statistical analysis in relation to the person, property, or site to be protected. The chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) threats could blur the already murky differences between the postulated and the credible.

    No security program, especially its plan, can be effective unless it is based upon a clear understanding of the postulated and credible threat or threats it is designed to control or otherwise mitigate. Clearly a single solution doesn?t apply in every case. As psychologist Abraham Maslow said, ?If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail.? "All change is not growth; all movement is not forward." Ellen Glasgow. ?Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.? And, ?Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness.? -- George Santayana. And worth repeating, ?If you don?t know where you?re going, chances are you won?t get there.? -- Yogi Berra.

    The foregoing statements should serve as the basis of all security activity. Assessing the threat is to objectively examine the criticality, sensitivity, and vulnerability of the person, place, or thing that is to be protected from either natural or manmade incidents to include espionage. We are plagued by what are called ?the avoidance of blame mentality? and ?a low ceiling of imagination.? We succumbed to both and lost miserably. As cartoonist Mort Kelly?s character Pogo ®? opined, ?We have met the enemy and it is us!?

    Vulnerability is reduced by realistic security education and motivation training; contingency plans for natural and manmade emergencies; a trained, competent, and well managed security response force; meaningful entry and movement control; effective interior and exterior security lighting systems; and well engineered and installed personal and perimeter alarm systems.

    To save from harm, security must effectively and efficiently delay, detect, alert, and respond. We cannot afford to let those covered in this survey, become statistics ─ regardless of status: employee, consultant, invitee, or family member.

    2. GENERALIZED THREAT TO BUILDINGS AND OCCUPANTS:

    Depending upon the mission of the facility or the status or position homeowner covered in this survey, it could be a lightning rod for national and international terrorism, biochemical or narco-terrorism. The recent bombings and aircraft hijackings are, in the judgement of many security professionals; further salvos in a continuing long lived battle.

    Credible threat factors are based on perceived current and future circumstances that must be periodically reviewed through continuing attention to new or modified information concerning objectives, intentions, and capabilities of adversarial elements that show potential for being reclassified from a postulated threat to a credible threat. There is not always a clear distinction; therefore, there must be a continuing alertness and continuing reassessment of relative risk factors that come to the attention of persons responsible for security.

    The value of professionally formulated and managed security education and security awareness programs cannot be over emphasized. Continuing cooperative dialogue with employees coupled with effective liaison with other security and law enforcement agencies are essential in order to exploit potential sources of threat information and recognize potential vulnerabilities at an early stage.

    The best examples may be the truck bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah (APM) Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the destruction of both World Trade Center (WTC) towers in New York City and the partial destruction of the Pentagon in Arlington Virginia. The latter three incidents were caused by airborne intrusions of commercial aircraft hijacked by 19 Islamic Fundamentalists. This is not a terrorist war but a religious war. No quantifiable pattern of activity or trends was extant which alerted the General Services Administration, security managers of the WTC, or its tenants to a credible threat from a particular terrorist group or predictable actions by that or any other group directed toward the APM or WTC. The FBI received intelligence information from the CIA and other quarters, but the pieces were put together subsequent to the terrorist incidents. It?s ironic, in 1983, Colonel Charles A. Hammaker, Jr., Chief, Security Office, US Army DARCOM, made a presentation to the Army Physical Security Action Group in which he stated there should be a plan for airborne intrusions into the Pentagon, other government and commercial buildings. In 1999, Professor Stephen Gale, University of Pennsylvania, along with other panelists briefed FAA there was a probability of civilian aircraft being used in such a fashion. FAA disregarded that warning because hijackers had not commandeered aircraft for that purpose before, besides FAA had invested millions of dollars in sophisticated screening equipment to thwart hijackers and other miscreants. There were low probability factors, but high vulnerability factors!

    Accordingly, the potential as well as the probability for a hostile force to crash hijacked civilian aircraft into the WTC towers and the Pentagon should have been considered by the responsible building and tenant security officials, even allowing that the particular fundamentalist group had not been identified as a local threat to the US occupied buildings.

    Consequently, the historical fact of the destruction of the APM, WTC or Pentagon should bring into focus the relative likelihood of any fundamentalist or terrorist group or a local adversarial element targeting the persons, property, and operations in the surveyed facility through any determinable area of vulnerability. Various reasons can be postulated, including intentions of harming or intimidating notable personalities. Certainly, it was realistic to assume that a hostile element might be expected to bypass well-protected buildings or military facilities in favor of a more vulnerable site such as this facility in order to gain publicity, notoriety or revenge, or more objectively, to further general or specific objectives by impeding the mission of the facility or in a domestic situation the lives of the principal and family.

    Enjoy the day,
    Bill

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