Can we control weapons at malls?

[SIW Editor]

The shooting in Tacoma area last week which involved hostages pointed out the vulnerability of our malls (Tom Clancy pointed it out in a book some years ago, too). Some say that increasing mall security to the point of being able to keep weapons out is impractical due to the need to keep malls open and accessible to encourage the shopping experience.

I think that may be true, but as detection systems become more accurate and have faster through-put and become smaller such that they can be easily integrated into door controls and door hardware/door frames, I believe there is the potential in the future of detecting weapons before they get in the mall. Is this 2 years out? 5 years out? 10 years out? Hard to say.

This being the shopping season, our malls are more vulnerable than ever, and I think it's a bit much to expect that our security officers will be able to recognize "suspicious" individuals. I know that at my local mall, the police officers on duty are basically stationing themselves out at the food court, reviewing persons who walk through that key corridor. They are doing walking tours of the facility from time to time, as well.

I know malls are getting more and more surveillance cameras and these are often now available in video feeds to police responders, but what else can we do?

What do you think? How can we beef up security at malls without killing the retail "openess"?

BTW, here's a follow-up article about the shooting at the Tacoma, WA mall:
http://www.securityinfowatch.com/online/Retail/Boosting-Security-Measures-at-Malls-Not-Practical/6522SIW379

Geoff Kohl
SIW Editor

[N. A. Corbier]

I could see installing passive sensors at all entrances and exits, combined with real-time cameras to detect who sets the metal detectors off. The detectors could be installed in either EAS looking arches, or in the doorframes.

This leads to another issue: How to handle off-duty police officers (licensed to carry by authority,) CCW permit holders (licensed to carry by statute,) and Federal authorities (Suits and guns.) If the system simply goes off without attendance and then security/police respond to the event - that's going to be alot of checking up on lawful individuals who may complain.

One solution would be to put up private property "no firearms" signs, however, some states allow CCW holders to simply ignore the signs legally. This will also not stop LEOs from carrying - and setting off any passive detection grid.

A more active approach is needed, but people will most likely equate "active" with "airport" and be annoyed that it they're being funnelled, processed, and scanned.

[Bill Warnock]

From what I know about metal detectors, they would alarm on metallic objects in purses, pockets, shoes, some outer ware with metallic linings and jewelry.
In Manassas Mall located in Prince William County Virginia, mall management has posted warning signs stating all firearms are prohibited except for sworn law enforcement personnel. These warning signs were journalized in the county court clerk?s office. Agreed, invitees and mall personnel are not made safe by signs. Virginia permits open carry as well as CCW permits.
The FBI recently sent local law enforcement agencies and mall management informational letters stating a heightened state of security awareness exists and all parties concerned must exercise increased security diligence and report suspicious persons and activities and unattended parcels and packages to mall management, mall security or local police. They cite the recent hotel bombings in Jordan and mall bombings in the Philippines.
This puts the onus on mall management to develop security strategies some of whom are totally unprepared. Enclosed malls are the most affected as strip malls have offsite or absent management or landlords. Local law enforcement is stretched to the limit now, now additional work is thrust their way.
Therefore customers, invitees, store management and security, if provided, must exercise a degree of security awareness beyond looking for thieves or pickpockets.
Enjoy the day,
Bill

[N. A. Corbier]

The strip malls have to have the worst of the problem with securing the multiple facilities. They worry about bottom line, minimum expenditure in the security/maintenance/facilities category.

The best they can do is hire a private security comptany to perform an assessment for each of their strip mall locations. It is hard, as always, to prove the negative and show a quantifable loss reduction by deploying private security forces in areas you know little about - being one of 2,400 properties your company manages.

This can lead, of course, to selecting a company that sounds "too good to be true." Promising things that no security company paying an unarmed, untrained, employee minimum wage can hope to accomplish. Robbery prevention, for example, is a stretch when there is no threat of police intervention (due to the guard having communications) or security intervention (due to the guard having a deadly force option such as a firearm). Identifying indicators of terrorist activity is hard when the employee recieves no training, and has to go off what he sees on CNN. Indeed, most activities that private security provide in the protection area - protection of the property, tennants, and patrons; enforcement of client rules; and maintenance of good order - require trained professionals to accomplish.

Enclosed malls have the advantage as they operate with a high customer service expectation. Everyone is used to mall security, they expect protection by the security force to some degree, and the mall's security directors provide it.

The strip mall, unfournately, seems not to be as organized in the protection of assets as enclosed malls are.

[SEO_09]

Just a note, in most states persons that have a CCW can not carry weapons into public places such as malls, government buildings and on private property where the owner has prohibited weapons.

[plankeye]

around here the mall security forces are not armed, but you know what, they should be, simply for the fact that you dont know what kind of people are walking into the mall. I would put up large signs so the public can see it, more increased security precense around entrances and I guess hope for the best. Alot of people would probably quit shopping at that certain mall because they dont want to be screened, it would be a hassle to the customers and to the officers doing the screening when all day long they would hear complaints, names being called at them, hositilty among the customers. I would just do more increased armed security patrols around entrances and the whole interiror of the mall itself. And try to have all Mall staff trained in what to look for like someone who is acting nervous, odd or just unusual behaviour

[The_Mayor]

I think that may be true, but as detection systems become more accurate and have faster through-put and become smaller such that they can be easily integrated into door controls and door hardware/door frames, I believe there is the potential in the future of detecting weapons before they get in the mall. Is this 2 years out? 5 years out? 10 years out? Hard to say.

Disneyland, Great America, and the fairgrounds all use metal detectors at points of entry. It does not appear that these business suffer a lack of patronage due to the metal detectors. Of course, people will feel hasseled if they are subjected to these security measures as a condition of entry. If metal detectors were used at malls, I would imagine it would take some "getting used to" on part of the American public.

Realistically, it could be any of the above; 2, 5, or 10 years. I don't see metal detectors in place in all malls..unless we start to see suicide bombers and other terrorists. While we prefer to be proactive..administrators (who make the decisions) tend to be reactive. This is unfortunate.




I know malls are getting more and more surveillance cameras and these are often now available in video feeds to police responders, but what else can we do?

What do you think? How can we beef up security at malls without killing the retail "openess"?

Beefing up security presence helps. 5 officers is better than 1. During holiday season it is imparitive to have more officers.

Hire armed security for these malls. Malls are some of the most dangerous places to work security.

On a side note..the first amendement gives citizens the right to keep and bear arms. I learned this first hand..we had a "man with a gun" call to the local pd for a guy in one of the restaurants. The guy was seated with is 357 openley displayed in his holster (Not Security or an LEO). The cops ordered him down, ran him, ran his gun...CLEAN.

Turns out his gun was unloaded..and he can legally have it displayed for all to see. What good would a metal detector do in this case?? :confused:

[Bill Warnock]

MANPOWER SURVEY CALCULATIONS


1 man
24 hours x 365 days
8,760 hours

1 man
08 hours x 052 weeks
2,080 hours

1 man
24 hours x 007 days
00168 hours

1 man
08 hours x 007 days
00056 hours

1 man
08 hours x 005 days
00040 hours

(See following page for hourly calculations)


Hours 7 Days 5 Days 2 Days 1 Day
½
0.1
0.070833
0.029167
0.014166

1
0.2
0.141
0.058
0.028200

2
0.4
0.282
0.116
0.056400

3
0.6
0.423
0.174
0.084600

4
0.8
0.564
0.232
0.112800

5
1.0
0.705
0.290
0.141000

6
1.2
0.846
0.348
0.169200

7
1.4
0.987
0.406
0.197400

8
1.6
1.128
0.464
0.225600

9
1.8
1.269
0.522
0.253800

10
2.0
1.410
0.580
0.282000

11
2.2
1.551
0.638
0.310200

12
2.4
1.692
0.696
0.338400

13
2.6
1.833
0.754
0.366600

14
2.8
1.974
0.812
0.394800

15
3.0
2.115
0.870
0.423000

16
3.2
2.256
0.928
0.451200

17
3.4
2.397
0.986
0.479400

18
3.6
2.538
1.044
0.507600

19
3.8
2.679
1.102
0.535800

20
4.0
2.820
1.160
0.564000

21
4.2
2.961
1.218
0.592200

22
4.4
3.102
1.276
0.620400

23
4.6
3.243
1.334
0.648600

24
4.8
3.4
1.4
0.680000

These are the manpower calculations that mall management and security supervisors must think about before they implement a security plan. At present, most malls resemble a warren, so some entrances and exists would have to closed or additional manpower factored in.
Post and patrol orders would have to be SITE specific to work properly. Training would have to be intense to cover the threats. That means "big bucks" to mall management.
Enjoy the day,
Bill

[The_Mayor]

Training would have to be intense to cover the threats. That means "big bucks" to mall management.

It is a delicate balance; Clients Expectations vs. "Big Bucks" vs. Vicarious Liability.

Is there a price one can put on Safety?

[N. A. Corbier]

Trying to remember what the formula is, someone help me... But...

The price of safety is:

Estimate:
the cost of needed improvements/implementation to reduce/limit liability

vs

the cost of increased insurance premium, civil liability payout, and statstical probability that a liability event will occur.

Whichever is cheaper wins.

[Bill Warnock]

N.A., that is sad but so very true. With the big money in settlements, that may change. The terror threat may start driving the train. In portion of an often Winston Churchill quoted line, "Death is driving the clattering train."
Enjoy the day,
Bill

[Mr. Security]

Firearms and knives - YES
Bombs (in trash receptacles, etc) - MAYBE
Suicide bombers - NO :(
Biological/Chemical - NO :(

[N. A. Corbier]

Firearms and knives - YES
Bombs (in trash receptacles, etc) - MAYBE
Suicide bombers - NO :(
Biological/Chemical - NO :(

I think it'd be easier to control nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons through active and passive detection grids than your firearm and knife. Explosives, as well. There are already systems designed to detect at stand-off ranges explosives and NBC weapons. Of course, these are expensive as hell, don't have a 100% percent hit rate, and require massive planning.

Defeating explosives can be accomplished through defense-in-design. Oh, hell, I just completely forgot what that term is. :( Where you use landscaping, overt and hidden obstacles, and other terrain and architectual designs to discourage attack, hinder the attack vectors, and minimize loss of life if the attack vector is successful.

Unforunately, that would require alot of retro-fitting of current mall facilities. If you look at the DoD, you can see alot of eye-pleasing designs that use bullards, switch-backs, and projectile screens. You'd never notice them if your not looking, but it makes it alot harder to get a vehicle-based-bomb into the lobby of the facility.

Alot of malls are designed for vehicles to drive right up into the main concourses. This is usually so that the local auto dealers can showcase a car inside, or so that construction vehicles can get access to the interior of the building for crane repairs, etc. I'm sure there are other reasons.

But, this makes a vehicle-based-bomb very easy to get into the facility. Just locate the vehicle doors on your recon, then drive right through them. They're usually glass, and will buckle when rammed.

Placing Bullards on those entrances is prohibitative to the function of the doors, unforunately.

As far as defeating human-based explosive/shooter threats, we seem to be leaving any actual show of force screening to law enforcement. I'm not sure how much of the general public would actually believe a mall security force could screen them legally - some might attempt to enter the facility anyway.

I don't know about anyone else, but the cost of having 40 sworn law enforcement officer surrounding your mall ala Miami Beach PD and interrogating everything that comes near it is probally as great as installing an active sensor network.

[Bill Warnock]

CPTED, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, was put forth by Timothy D. Crowe, National Crime Prevention Institute. Tim has modified the concept several times to meet the changing threats. Ballards and vehicle barriers, active and passive, can be used, but at what price? As N.A. rightly points out, it will be mind over matter. I am afraid we have all decided to sit back and wait. After 9/11 we developed an edge. Now according to the 9/11 Commission Chairman, we've lost that edge. We in this security profession can not afford to sit back and wait.
We have a hotline and it is abused. Most calls are get-even or get-back at someone, not security related issues.
We can surround a facility with sworn LEOs, factor in the cost and our disdain of a police state are limiting factors.
Training and the proper use of intelligence are keys to drawing even with the threat driven scenarios. What establishes threat? Three things! Criticality, Sensitivity and Vulnerability. We must rework these three things. Critical to what? government operations or our feeling of wellbeing. Sensitivity to what? our water supply, electricity or our wellbeing. Velnerable to what? not available when we need or want it or our wellbeing.
Enjoy the day,
Bill

[N. A. Corbier]

Has anyone heard (professionally) about the Miami plan to start surrounding buildings and doing ID checks, baggage screening, and other "high visibility" activity? Generally speaking, this will be interesting to see.

Its Florida, and business owners have been known to give agent of property owner rights to law enforcement agencies. Even if they don't, in this instance, they can still perform investigative detainments on public property.

Google News had several stories about this. I haven't seen anything more about it, yet, though.

[Mr. Security]

Does anyone think that facial recognition software (not sure if this is included in the biometric category) would help? Granted, if a suspected terrorist is not in the system it wouldn't work. However, if everyone who is on the terrorist watch list were in the system it may help. Any thoughts? :confused:

[N. A. Corbier]

City of Tampa tried to use Facial Recongition Software in Ybor City. From what I remember, it didn't work that well. As in, at all.

[OccamsRazor]

An agency I used to work for employed the face-it (or whatever else they're calling it nowadays) in downtown Seattle during a national law enforcement conference. IIRC, there were about several arrests made on outstanding felony warrants in the 3 days the system was in use. It was not publicized, and the system looked no different than your standard tinted dome security camera system.

I don't know about any terror suspects being ID'd, but the intel weenies were all over the screens.

[SIW Editor]

interesting discussion here.

garbage in, garbage out applies to the use of facial recognition technology.

as i understand it, the facial recognition technology was tried at a superbowl some years back and failed miserably, didn't recognize a single person.

some facts to consider -- are the cameras these systems are running on top of simple evidentiary surveillance cameras? are they high on the poles to record what's going on in the area, not to ID individuals? success rate is almost guaranteed to be low on those.

the other aspect is what kind of data/image do we have on suspects. newer images made while in custody in a controlled environment in color where lighting control can be had are going to be better than an old image off a suspected terrorist's former passport. If you're trying to match a man walking beside a camera where you miss 1/3 of his face and are trying to match to a dated, poor-quality image in the database.... well, you can imagine the problems with that. now if you've got a full mug style shot with head straight on and sideways views too... now you're talking.

today's newer high-resolution cameras from companies like Cohu and a few other brands that you see advertised on this website and in affiliated magazines are changing this equation. they can be further away to give the wide-area surveillance effect, but have strong resolution to capture the details in the image.

wil, glad to hear they saw some success with this technology in seattle.

my prediction is that facility security directors will willingly allow these databases to run on their surveillance systems, especially as their own surveillance systems turn toward digital based and IP-based platforms, and especially if they're operating a "public" type of facility like a concert halls, schools, bus stations, banks, malls, etc. but for that to happen, you'd probably have to see the FBI/DHS/Secret Service help pay for the technology to be put there, in which case you'd have the ACLU all over it.

[Mr. Security]

interesting discussion here.

garbage in, garbage out applies to the use of facial recognition technology.

as i understand it, the facial recognition technology was tried at a superbowl some years back and failed miserably, didn't recognize a single person.

No question about it, technology depends on accurate data to function properly. However, what's interesting about facial recognition technology is that it's based on facial features that cannot be changed no matter how a person tries to disguise them self. Features such as bone structure, distance between the eyes, etc. As you pointed out, technology today is vastly superior to what was state-of-the-art just a few years ago. It's reasonable to believe that such technology will continue to improve and become more affordable as time goes on.

Beats making a mall look like military compound. :)

[wisconsinite]

Can we control weapons at malls?? Sadly...NO! That would entail putting metal detectors and posted security officers at EVERY door, every dock, every employee entrance the mall has. Your average mall has a lot of entry points. Manpower costs alone would go through the stratosphere. Not to mention, ONE of those walk-through type of metal detectors costs at least THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS! EACH!
http://www.tamiamiarmor.com/MetalDetecPag3.htm
Show me a mall security department that has the financial budget to cover that caliber of equiptment and manpower costs. You can't!
And let's not forget, your average consumer is NOT going to tolerate being frisked and searched just so they can buy a present for their kids birthday, and such. Thousands of people enter their local mall every day. Can you imagine the line that's formed, just to get into the place? Sales would plummet!
So... Can we control weapons at malls? Not A Chance!

[1stWatch]

Can we control weapons at malls?? Sadly...NO! That would entail putting metal detectors and posted security officers at EVERY door, every dock, every employee entrance the mall has. Your average mall has a lot of entry points. Manpower costs alone would go through the stratosphere. Not to mention, ONE of those walk-through type of metal detectors costs at least THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS! EACH!
http://www.tamiamiarmor.com/MetalDetecPag3.htm
Show me a mall security department that has the financial budget to cover that caliber of equiptment and manpower costs. You can't!
And let's not forget, your average consumer is NOT going to tolerate being frisked and searched just so they can buy a present for their kids birthday, and such. Thousands of people enter their local mall every day. Can you imagine the line that's formed, just to get into the place? Sales would plummet!
So... Can we control weapons at malls? Not A Chance!

Finally, someone who sees this issue the same way I do. I like the way you think.

[Mr. Security]

Can we control weapons at malls?? Sadly...NO! That would entail putting metal detectors and posted security officers at EVERY door, every dock, every employee entrance the mall has. Your average mall has a lot of entry points. Manpower costs alone would go through the stratosphere. Not to mention, ONE of those walk-through type of metal detectors costs at least THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS! EACH!
http://www.tamiamiarmor.com/MetalDetecPag3.htm
Show me a mall security department that has the financial budget to cover that caliber of equiptment and manpower costs. You can't!
And let's not forget, your average consumer is NOT going to tolerate being frisked and searched just so they can buy a present for their kids birthday, and such. Thousands of people enter their local mall every day. Can you imagine the line that's formed, just to get into the place? Sales would plummet!
So... Can we control weapons at malls? Not A Chance!

You made some good points. :) Remember though, the objective is to control, not stop weapons at malls. After all, even super-max prisons have their share of weapons made in-house. The cost for metal detectors could become affordable if the expense is passed on to the stores that occupy the mall (I know that means the consumer eventually). The metal detector sensitivity needs to be adjusted primarily so that firearms signal a warning. This would minimize nuisance alarms. As technology improves and more companies are formed to manufacture security-screening equipment, the cost should decrease. It's a challenge all right, but not impossible.

[wisconsinite]

You made some good points. :) Remember though, the objective is to control, not stop weapons at malls. After all, even super-max prisons have their share of weapons made in-house. The cost for metal detectors could become affordable if the expense is passed on to the stores that occupy the mall (I know that means the consumer eventually). The metal detector sensitivity needs to be adjusted primarily so that firearms signal a warning. This would minimize nuisance alarms. As technology improves and more companies are formed to manufacture security-screening equipment, the cost should decrease. It's a challenge all right, but not impossible.

Actually, Mr. Security, I beg to differ. The objective IS to stop weapons. All we need is one bad apple with C4, TNT, or Chemical-Biological agents to get past us and it'll be an environmental and/or human catastrophe. Well, that example is possible, but not likely. I'm just thinking on a worse-case scenario situation. Before 2001, not even the government thought it was conceivable to fly an airplane into a building.

[ACP01]

Actually, Mr. Security, I beg to differ. The objective IS to stop weapons. All we need is one bad apple with C4, TNT, or Chemical-Biological agents to get past us and it'll be an environmental and/or human catastrophe. Well, that example is possible, but not likely. I'm just thinking on a worse-case scenario situation. Before 2001, not even the government thought it was conceivable to fly an airplane into a building.

Just something to think about....
If it is one of the local gang-bangers or just a citizen that forgot about the no-carry signs at the mall yes you could probably keep the weapons out. But if it is someone bent on causing havoc on a grand scale you would be hard pressed to even slow them down and I do mean even with a well setup entrance control and an armed security team response.

[Mr. Security]

Actually, Mr. Security, I beg to differ. The objective IS to stop weapons. All we need is one bad apple with C4, TNT, or Chemical-Biological agents to get past us and it'll be an environmental and/or human catastrophe. Well, that example is possible, but not likely. I'm just thinking on a worse-case scenario situation. Before 2001, not even the government thought it was conceivable to fly an airplane into a building.

You already stated that stopping weapons is not possible. If you mean what you said then you have an impossible objective. Impossible objectives are not going to get the job done. Attainable goals will. Thus my use of the word "control."

[Bill Warnock]

Actually, Mr. Security, I beg to differ. The objective IS to stop weapons. All we need is one bad apple with C4, TNT, or Chemical-Biological agents to get past us and it'll be an environmental and/or human catastrophe. Well, that example is possible, but not likely. I'm just thinking on a worse-case scenario situation. Before 2001, not even the government thought it was conceivable to fly an airplane into a building.
Wisconsinite at a meeting in 1983 of DOD's Physical Security Working Group, US Army Colonel Charles A. Hammaker, Jr., Chief, Secrity Office, US Army DARCOM, now Army Materiel Command, stated in his portion of the briefing there was no plan in place to thwart airborne assults against the Pentagon. His scenario was to hijack a passenger airliner taking off from either Dulles or National Airports and fly it into the Pentagon.
DOD looked upon that scenario as a flight of fancy. Eighteen years the flight of fancy flew into that building along with others in New York and possibly the White House had it not been for the brave passengers.
Enjoy the day,
Bill

[wisconsinite]

Wisconsinite at a meeting in 1983 of DOD's Physical Security Working Group, US Army Colonel Charles A. Hammaker, Jr., Chief, Secrity Office, US Army DARCOM, now Army Materiel Command, stated in his portion of the briefing there was no plan in place to thwart airborne assults against the Pentagon. His scenario was to hijack a passenger airliner taking off from either Dulles or National Airports and fly it into the Pentagon.
DOD looked upon that scenario as a flight of fancy. Eighteen years the flight of fancy flew into that building along with others in New York and possibly the White House had it not been for the brave passengers.
Enjoy the day,
Bill

Thank You for that info Bill! I was unaware the "flight of Fancy" dates back to 1983.

Secondly, Mr. Security, I'll agree that impossible objectives won't get the job done. So I'll agree to use the word "control" in your context. I dunno, maybe Iv'e been watching Keifer Sutherland show '24' for too long. I wonder if there really is a CTU. LOL.

[N. A. Corbier]

DOD and FEMA have discounted quite a bit of CONUS attack scenerios by foreign and domestic aversarial groups.

Oklahoma City is another instance where folks didn't think someone could just drive a bomb up next to the building and detonate it.

I was a teenager at the time, and when I saw the news, I went, "Gee, someone parked a truck full of ANFO." Lo and behold, someone indeed parked a van full of ANFO barrels, and detonated it.

The United States Government is always looking at the previous incident when formulating defense strategy, especially with CONUS. I think alot of this is simply because the previous target is documented, and you can therefore get budget and resource approval to protect against a "verified" deficiency.

You know, if you call driving a bomb into a building, or an aircraft, or a boat into a cruise ship (They tried it in Israel) "verification."

[schampcpp]

The word is control. Having a "Code of Coduct" on each door stating your rules, you are able to control some of the bad things that you try and prepare for to happen in your mall. An emergency plan that can adapt, is your best offense. Everbody is in the "terrorist" mode. Living in Iowa, My first terrorist is Mother Nature. We had 215 tornado strikes in Iowa in 2004, and 187 tornado strikes in 2005, and numerous snowstorms.
If your emergency plan is adaptable, you can use it to your advantage.
I have had many emergencies in my 35 years of Security, I am lucky to say a death has not happened on my watch. This includes Indutrial, Hospital, Museums, and now at a Shopping Mall.
Can we stop weapons? No, can we be ready, Damn straight!!!
Be Safe, and Prepared

[wisconsinite]

If any of you have seen the show '24' on Monday night the 13th of Feb., you saw 'Jack Bauer' being kidnapped by the terrorists, and take a CENTOX nerve gas bomb into a mall. They proceed to the back of the house, and summon a SECURITY OFFICER. When the Security Officer asks the terrorists for paperwork, he gets popped. It's that easy folks. That could be me, or you.
After that, havoc ensues.

[Mr. Security]

If any of you have seen the show '24' on Monday night the 13th of Feb., you saw 'Jack Bauer' being kidnapped by the terrorists, and take a CENTOX nerve gas bomb into a mall. They proceed to the back of the house, and summon a SECURITY OFFICER. When the Security Officer asks the terrorists for paperwork, he gets popped. It's that easy folks. That could be me, or you.
After that, havoc ensues.

The key to derailing a terrorist attack is not the way it's handled when "it goes down." Rather, it's preventing it in the first place. Experts have realized that major terrorist attacks involve considerable planning, surveillance, and even rehearsals. That's why s/o's are an excellent first defense against terrorism. If we stay alert, observe, report, and investigate all suspicious vehicles, people, behavior and the like, we may be able to stop an attack BEFORE it starts. Once the attack begins, even the best response will not be as good as preventing it in the first place.

[Bill Warnock]

The key to derailing a terrorist attack is not the way it's handled when "it goes down." Rather, it's preventing it in the first place. Experts have realized that major terrorist attacks involve considerable planning, surveillance, and even rehearsals. That's why s/o's are an excellent first defense against terrorism. If we stay alert, observe, report, and investigate all suspicious vehicles, people, behavior and the like, we may be able to stop an attack BEFORE it starts. Once the attack begins, even the best response will not be as good as preventing it in the first place.
Right on Mr. Security. Prevention is our claim to fame. Before police and sheriff departments established crime prevention bureaus, that was our gig.
Enjoy the day,
Bill